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As  I  look  at the  future  of  the  cotton  industry,  I  am  impressed
by  the  understanding  cotton  farmers  have  of  what  the  future  holds
for  them  and  what  they  can  do  to  improve  their  situation.  I  cer-
tainly  cannot,  in good conscience,  tell  these  farmers  that if  they  will
merely  contribute  a  little more  toward  research  and  promotion  they
will  solve  all  of  their  problems  and  be  able  to  make  good  livings
as  cotton  farmers  for  the  rest  of  their  days.  Many  of  them  under-
stand  that  the  tide  of  history  is  unmistakably  running  against  the
cotton industry  in  this country.  The  sooner  we  accept  this economic
fact,  the  sooner  we are going  to bring  our political  actions  and  poli-
cies  into  line  with reality.
A  series  of  events  has  prevented  this  trend  from  making  itself
painfully  obvious  in  a  decline  in  total  consumption  of  U.S.-grown
cotton.  First,  there  was  the  Korean  War  with  its  sharp  increase  in
demand  for  cotton.  Following  that  war,  cotton  exports  began  to
decline  very  rapidly,  but  this  decline  was  arrested  by  substantial
export  subsidies  and  a  P.L.  480  program.  The  record  shows  that  it
has  been  necessary  to  increase almost  continuously  the  rate  of  sub-
sidy  in  order  to  maintain  the  recent  level  of  exports.  I  think  it  is
fairly  clear  that  we  would  not be  exporting  any  cotton  today  if the
effective  export  price  had  been  maintained  at  the  1954-55  level.
Recently  domestic  consumption  of  cotton  has  risen  to  the  high-
est level  since  1950-51.  On  the  surface  that  would  seem  to  suggest
a  fairly  optimistic  future  for  cotton.  However,  in  August  1964,  we
began  to  pay  a  subsidy  of  6.5  cents  per  pound  for  domestic  con-
sumption of  cotton.  In August  1965,  the  support  price  was  lowered
and  the  subsidy  cut;  the  net  price  to domestic  cotton  mills  dropped
about  another  cent  per  pound.  The  recent  increase  in  consumption
is due in large  part  to the fact that the  effective  price  of  cotton  paid
by  domestic  mills  has  dropped  by  one-fourth.  Another  factor  con-
tributing  to  the  recent  increase  in cotton  consumption  has  been  the
increased  number  of  troops  stationed  in  Viet  Nam.  Early  attempts
by  the Defense  Department  to  supply  these  troops  with  uniforms  of
man-made  fibers  were  quickly  abandoned  as  the  troops  demanded
all-cotton uniforms for the hot and humid climate.  In spite  of  a drop
in the  domestic  price  of  cotton  by  more than  one-fourth,  a  substan-
67tial  increase  in  population,  and  a  war  in  Viet Nam,  total  domestic
cotton  consumption  is  still lower than  it  was  in  1950-51.
Starting in August  1966,  the rate  of subsidy on cotton-now  paid
directly  to  the  farmer-was  raised  to  9.42  cents  per  pound  on  cot-
ton that is  grown and  10.5  cents for cotton  not grown on  the allotted
acres.  This  will  lower  the  effective  price  of  U.S.  cotton  in both  do-
mestic  and  foreign  markets  by  about  two  cents  per  pound.
With  the  sharp  reduction  in  planted  acreage  under  the  1966
cotton  program  and  projected  increases  in  domestic  consumption
and  exports,  carryover  should  decline  substantially  from  the  current
level  by  the  end  of  the  current  four-year  program.  But,  with  no
further  increase  in  the  rate  of  subsidy,  I  believe  that by  the  end  of
the  current  program  exports  will  be  down  substantially  from the  ex-
pected  level  for  the  1966  crop;  and  the  rate  of  domestic  consump-
tion  will  also  fall  significantly  from  current  levels.  I  think  that  cot-
ton  farmers  will  have  to  get  used  to  the  idea  of  planting  no  more
cotton  than  they did  in  1966.
In  the  remainder  of  this  paper,  I  will  present  the  basis  for  my
conclusions.  The markets  for  U.S.  cotton  will  be  discussed,  and  the
prospects  for research  and promotion  will be  considered.
THE  FOREIGN  MARKET  FOR  U.S.  COTTON
Table  1 shows  the  price  of  U.S.  cotton  in  foreign  markets  has
fallen  by  more  than  30  percent  from  1955  to  1965.  An  additional
drop  of about  two  cents per pound  is  expected  in  the  marketing  sea-
son that has just begun.
U.S.  net  exports  have  shown  fantastic  fluctuations  from  year
to  year.  Close  examination  reveals  a  definite  relationship  between
the  price  and  level  of  exports.  Foreign  users  of  cotton  have  always
had  sufficient  warning  of  future  drops  in  the  U.S.  export  price  so
that  they  have  been  able  to  cut  their  imports  from  the  U.S.  and
reduce  stocks  to  a  bare  minimum  before  the  price  drop  and  thus
avoid  a capital loss on cotton  in  inventory.  Following  the price drop,
foreign  buyers  expand  their  purchases  dramatically  as  they  build
their stocks back  to normal operating  levels.  The drop  in net exports
for  1965  is  directly  related  to  the  anticipated  drop  in  price  in  the
1966  season.
Table  2  shows  that  foreign  cotton  production  has  increased  in
every  year but one  since the Korean War.  Without  the  drop in price,
foreign  production  surely  would  have  expanded  more  rapidly  than
it  has  since  1958,  and  total foreign  consumption  would not have  ex-
68TABLE  1.  NET  EXPORTS  FROM  THE  U.S.  AND  WORLD  PRICE  OF
UPLAND  COTTON,  1953-65
Net  Exports  from
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*Liverpool price of U.S. middling  1  312-inch  cotton.
SOURCE:  Cotton Situation, July  1966,  and  earlier  issues.
TABLE  2.  FOREIGN  PRODUCTION  OF  COTTON  AND  MAN-MADE  FIBERS  AND
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1962-63  Million  1962-63
= 100  Pounds  100
66.4
73.0  3,534  51.6
82.0  4,247  62.0
84.6  4,393  64.1
89.5  4,711  68.8
96.5  4,436  64.8
93.7  5,026  73.4
96.4  5,618  82.0
96.4  5,942  86.8
97.9  6,485  94.7
102.1  7,221  105.4
107.5  8,199  119.7
108.5  8,617  125.8
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SOURCES:  Cotton Situation, July  1966; USDA,  Analysis of Factors  Affecting  U.S.
Cotton Exports, Agricultural  Economics  Report  No.  90,  May  1966.
panded as rapidly  as it has.  The result would have been  a steadily de-
clining  quantity  of  U.S.  cotton  passing  into  foreign  markets.
Over  the  period  covered  by  Table  2  production  of  cotton  has





























1965textile  fibers.  This  means  that  foreign  cotton  production  has  been
able  to maintain  its  share  of  the  foreign  market  in  spite  of  the  large
reductions  in the  U.S.  export  price.
The  average  share  of  U.S.  cotton  in  the  foreign  market  has  de-
clined  steadily  in  spite  of  the  falling  U.S.  export  price.  Although
it  is  seldom  mentioned  by  others,  foreign  production  of  man-made
fibers  appears  to  me  to  be  fully  as  important  in the  decline  of  our
share  of  the  foreign  markets  as  U.S.  man-made  fiber  production  is
in  the  domestic  market  share.  Although  man-made  fibers  currently
take  a  much  smaller  share  of  the  foreign  market  for  textile  fibers
than  in  the  U.S.  market,  Table  2  shows  that  man-made  fiber  pro-
duction  has  been  expanding  at  about  twice  the  annual  rate  of  total
fiber  consumption.
It  appears  to  me  that  if  the  U.S.  cotton  industry  were  operating
today  without  government  subsidy  or  restriction  of  any  kind,  we
would  not  be  exporting  any  substantial  amount  of  cotton  and  the
world  price  of  cotton  would  be  somewhat  higher  than  it  is  going
to be  in  the  1966  season.  Perhaps  we  should  not  feel  quite  so  self-
righteous  about  our  foreign  aid  programs  when  at  the  very  same
time  we  are  probably  depressing  the incomes  of some  of  these  same
countries  by paying  our  domestic  producers  large  subsidies  in  order
to maintain  our  "traditional"  level  of exports.
THE  DOMESTIC  MARKET  FOR  U.S.  COTTON
The prospect of a record  high carryover  of cotton  into the  1966-
67  marketing  season  provided  the  impetus  for  the  enactment  of  a
new  cotton program  that would  cut production  below  domestic  con-
sumption  plus  exports,  and  thus  reduce  carryover.  Domestic  con-
sumption  plus exports  exceeded  production  in  only  four of  the  thir-
teen  years  from  1953  through  1965  as  is  shown  in  Table  3.  Under
the  new  program  for  the  1966  cotton  crop,  growers  have  elected  to
divert  over  30  percent  of  their  allotted  acres  from  cotton  produc-
tion,  and  they  will  receive  direct  payments  based  on  the  amount  of
diversion.
What has happened in the domestic  market  for textile  fibers  since
we  started  paying the  domestic  subsidy  in  August  of  1964?  In  order
to avoid  possible  distortions  from the  anticipation  of the  drop  in  cot-
ton  price, I  have  used  the  1962-63  season  as  the  basis  for  compari-
son  in Table  4.
While  the  price  of  cotton  to  the  mills  fell  by  slightly  more  than
one-fourth,  the rate  of consumption  increased  by  13  percent.  Perhaps
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SOURCE:  Cotton Situation, July  1966,  and  earlier issues.
TABLE  4.  CHANGES  IN  PRICES  TO  MILLS  AND  DAILY  RATES  OF  MILL
CONSUMPTION  FROM  THE  1962-63  SEASON  TO  THE  1965-66  SEASON
Percent Change  Percent Change
Fiber  in Price  in Quantity
Cotton








as much as one-half  of the increase in the rate  of cotton consumption
should  be attributed  to  the  war  in Viet  Nam  rather  than  the  reduc-
tion  in price  or cotton  promotion  or  anything  else.
During  most  of  the  postwar  period,  the  price  per  pound  of
rayon  has  been  about  the  same  as  the  price  of  cotton.  Earlier  re-
ductions  in  cotton  prices  were  usually  matched  by  the  rayon  pro-
ducers.  But  this  time  they  seem  to  have  elected  not  to  follow  the
cotton  price,  and  the  quoted  price  of  rayon  was  the  same  in  both
seasons.  With  no  price  reduction,  the  consumption  of  rayon  and
acetate  increased  almost  as  much  as  for  cotton.  However,  the  con-
sumption  of  rayon  and  acetate  actually  declined  by  about  2.5  per-
cent from  the  1964-65  season  to  the  1965-66  season.  So  it appears
that  the  price  reduction  on  cotton  with  no  price  reduction  on  rayon
may  be  taking  a  significant  slice  of  what  would  have  been  rayon's
















- -The  noncellulosics  have  a  quoted  price  per  pound  to  the  mills
that  is  three  to  four  times  as  high  as  the  price  of  cotton.  Table  4
shows  that  the  price  reduction  for  noncellulosics  was  slightly  more
than  that  for  cotton.  During  the  three-year  period  the  consumption
of  noncellulosics  more  than doubled.
How  can we explain  this rapid  increase  in the noncellulosic  fiber
consumption?  It  was  during  this  period  that  blends-such  as  65
percent  dacron  and  35  percent  cotton-quickly  displaced  all-cotton
shirts and  dresses  on  the  retail  store  counters.  I  was  startled  the  first
time  or  two that  I  asked  to  see  men's  dress  shirts  and  the salesman
led  me  to  the  blend  shirts  and  touted  their virtues.  I  began  to  sus-
pect  that  the  great  enthusiasm  for  selling  the  blends  was  based  on
a  greater  suggested  percentage  retail  markup  on  these  shirts  by  the
manufacturer.  However,  study  by  the  National  Cotton  Council  in-
dicates  that the  percentage  markup  is  generally  the  same  for  shirts
made  of the various  types of  fabrics.  As  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,
the  higher  price  of  the  basic  noncellulosic  fiber  is  probably  an  ad-
vantage  rather  than a  disadvantage  in  its  competition  with  all-cotton
garments.
Because  of  the  higher  price  for  the  fiber,  a  blend  shirt  is  more
expensive  to  make  than  an  all-cotton  shirt,  and  the  manufacturer
prices  the  shirts  accordingly.  The retailer applies  a standard  percent-
age  markup,  and  the  blend  shirt  goes  on  the  counter  at  a  substan-
tially  higher  price  and  greater  absolute  markup.  So,  for  every blend
shirt  sold  instead  of  an  all-cotton  shirt  the  salesman  and  the  man-
ager  of  the  department  increase  total  dollar  sales  and  the  store  in-
creases  its  net.  Generous  advertising  allowances  by  the  man-made
fiber  producer  to  the  retail  store  "presell"  the  customer  on  the
blends,  and  this adds  to the  incentive  to give  the blends  more  space
on  the  display  counter.  In  this  way  the  blend  shirts  have  literally
pushed  the  all-cotton  shirts  off the  counter.
The  man-made  fiber  producers  are  just  beginning  to  attack  the
sheet  and  pillowcase  market  with  blends.  They  have  not  yet  gained
a beachhead,  but it is probably just  a matter of time  until they  dom-
inate this  and other major  markets  that are  still essentially  all cotton.
The handwriting  is  on  the wall;  you  cannot  sell  your product  if
it  is  not  available  to the  ultimate  buyer.  Construction  that  will  sub-
stantially  increase  production  capacity  for man-made  fibers  has been
started  over  the  last  two  years.  The  objective  is  surely  not to  build
this  capacity  and  let  it  stand  unused.
It  is  conceivable  that  we  may  pass  through  a  phase  with  the
72blends  in which  cotton and man-made  fibers  actually  interact  in the
market  as  economic  complements  rather  than  substitutes.  But  it
would  be  naive to expect  that man-made  fiber  producers  will  be for-
ever  satisfied with  65  percent  of  the market.
THE  COTTON  RESEARCH  AND  PROMOTION  ACT
Sometime  in the  latter part  of  1966,  cotton  growers  will  vote on
a  marketing  order  which  would  collect  one  dollar  per  bale  from
them  to raise  money  to promote  cotton  and  support  research.  If the
order  is  approved  by  the  growers,  it  will  not  become  operational
until  the  1967  crop.
It has  been  estimated  that in  1965  the expenditure  for research,
development,  and  promotion  of  man-made  fibers  in the  U.S.  totaled
about  $205  million,  while  the  same  items  for  cotton  totaled  $30.5
million.  In view  of the  fact  that most  growers  in  the  West  have  for
several  years  voluntarily  contributed  their  one  dollar  per  bale  and
the  sharp  reduction  in planted  acres  under  the  new cotton  program,
it appears  doubtful  that the promotion  order  will  add as much  as  $7
million.
If  a  cotton  farmer  asked  me  how  I  think  he  should  vote  in  the
referendum,  I  would  tell  him,  "Vote  for  it,  but  don't  expect  this
one  dollar  per  bale  to  do  anything  more  than  slow  the  rate  of  de-
cline  in  cotton  consumption."  In  general,  expenditure  on  research
stands  up  quite  well  in  cost-benefit  analysis.  Of course,  the  shining
example  is  hybrid  corn  where  the  direct  benefits  each  year  amount
to five  to  seven  times  the  total  accumulated  research  cost  from  the
time  work  was  begun  on  hybrid  corn.
As  I  read  the  record  of  experience  from  advertising,  it  appears
to  me  that  advertising  brings  really  large  returns  only  on  a  new
product that  has characteristics  which  will  cause  it to sell  itself  once
the  consumer  has  been  induced  to  try  it.  The  permanent-press  gar-
ments made  of blends  seem to fall  into this  category  of selling  them-
selves.  Except  for the  "durable press"  fabrics,  cotton has not changed
substantially  over  the  entire  course  of recorded  history.
The  additional  expenditure  for  promotion  resulting  from  the
marketing  order  appears  to have  a  very  good  possibility  of  proving
economically  worthwhile  in  slowing  the  decline  in  cotton  consump-
tion.  But  any  really  big  payoff  from  advertising  will  not  come  until
processes  are  developed  for all-cotton garments  that have the no-iron
characteristics  of  the  blends'  permanent  press  without  substantially
reducing  fabric  strength  and  durability  as do the processes  currently
73used  for  cotton.  If  this  scientific  breakthrough  is  achieved,  the  ex-
pected  1967 advertising budget would be far below the  optimum level.
ADJUSTMENTS  UNDER  THE  1966  COTTON  PROGRAM  AND
REDUCED  COTTON  ACREAGE
The  net  income  of  cotton  farmers  during  the  course  of  the  cur-
rent  cotton program,  including  the  direct  government  payments,  will
probably  not  be  substantially  different  from  what  it  was  in  1965.
However,  this  is  certainly  not  true  of  those  involved  in  selling  in-
puts  for  cotton  production  or  those  processing  and  marketing  cot-
ton and  the  products  from  cottonseed.  Their  gross  volume  of  busi-
ness  is  a  function  of  planted  acres  or  volume  of  output.  Their  net
incomes  will  decline  proportionately  more  than  their  gross  incomes
with  a drop  in volume  of business.  The  firms  that  service  the cotton
farm  face  much  larger  adjustment  problems  than  the  farms.
Total  production  of  upland  cotton  in  Arizona  has  declined  in
every year since  1962. With  34  percent  of the  allotted  acres  diverted
from  production  in  1966,  total  production  will  be  down  about  40
percent  from  1962.  In  Arizona  we  are  looking  into  possible  cost
savings  that  would  result  from  leaving  some  of  the  gins  idle.  The
adjustments  called  for  are  more  likely  to  be  permanent  than  tem-
porary.
An  eventual  threat  to  the  large  cotton  farmers  is  the  possibility
of  Congress  placing  an  upper  limit  on  the  size  of  direct  payments
that  can  be  made  to  a  single  farmer.  Amendments  that  would  do
just that have already  been voted  on in  the Congress,  but  so  far they
have  been  defeated.
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Breaking the Poverty
Cycle